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I
THE TAX INCENTIVE DEVICE IN THE POVERTY CONTEXT
There is currently no reliable evidence of the value or the cost of any com-
munity economic development tax incentive, and because of this, it seems preferable
to experiment with broadly applicable tax devices before enacting or even proposing
legislation. Any one-track tax incentive system which benefits only a narrow band
of businesses will not produce a wide reception among those whose diverse needs
are not covered by it.1 Broad participation in an actual or simulated program can be
obtained, however, under a tax incentive system which, within an overall limit, per-
mits individual businesses to select a mixture of tax benefits which matches the
demands of the operation involved. A multi-track, taxpayer-choice incentive
system may become more narrow as facts are developed relating to taxpayer-use
frequency, economic results, and government costs, but breadth and scope are needed
initially in any experimental system to induce use of it. Actual simulation of highly
experimental tax incentives is one way to create businesses and jobs in ghettos. And
it is the only way to produce evidence of which tax incentives, if any, helped or
hindered the effort.
One factor which forces experimentation rather than legislation is the realization
that no one, in or out of government, can develop a factual case supporting the
value or the cost of any poverty area tax incentive. Community .economic develop-
ment tax incentives are a new, strange, and misunderstood phenomenon. No one
really knows what to expect of them because they have never been used in this
country before.2 Indeed, such incentives must draw business into ghettos in the first
place, a task not normally assigned to such devices. Because these kinds of incentives
* [The author, one of the draftsmen of the tax sections of the Community Self-Determination Act of
1968, is engaged in the private practice of law in Chicago.-Ed.]
'Part H1 of this article provides an example of how a one-channel tax incentive system can provide
significant tax benefits but illustrates that these are available only to a taxpayer willing to sell his
facility to a community corporation. Such a program dictates the types of businesses to be provided to
ghettos and the methods of providing them and is precisely the type of narrow program to be avoided.
2 Such tax incentives have been used extensively by numerous developing nations overseas. See Robin,
Developing Nations Eager for U.S. Investors, J. Coses.sac., March 2, x964. Some principles of foreign
economic development tax incentives were utilized in the preparation of the tax incentives discussed
here and those which were part of the Community Self-Determination Act of 1968.
'Several companies, such as IBM, Eastman Kodak, and Mattel Toys, have tried ghetto, operations in
the past two or three years. However, the ghetto operations of some companies have special support in
terms of loans, guarantees, out-put contracts, and gifts of senior managerial talent. The creation and
continued sponsorship of such ghetto operations, although laudible, cannot be regarded as motivated by
normal hard-nosed business considerations.
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are new and strange, there is considerable difficulty in thinking clearly about them,
and this is the reason why no one, especially in government, can produce enough of
an illusion of certainty about their effect and their cost to justify proposing a definite
incentive program to Congress.
Rather than wasting another three years waiting for nothing to happen,4 it is
time to recognize that the government has three choices with respect to poverty area
tax incentives: (a) it can forget about them; (b) it can recognize that no one has the
evidence necessary to soundly predict the value to the taxpayer or the cost to the
government of any incentive, but ask for tax legislation anyway (and let all parties
wink at the absence of facts); or (c) it can recognize that no one has the facts and
say so, but proceed with a more pragmatic search for a solution through tax legisla-
tion simulation. The purpose of this article is to explore this last alternative.
This new approach should include a realization that the purpose of any in-
centive is to change a taxpayer's mind about the financial attractiveness of a par-
ticular activity. Thus, it is necessary to discover what risks bother him, and to
attempt to quantify those risks as he would. Instead of asking for tax legislation
without examining what incentive might induce a change of mind, the govern-
ment should actually simulate the incentives by cash payments which allow each
cooperating taxpayer to choose the incentives he thinks best for him. This approach
should provide a basis for determining which tax incentives, if any, provide the
necessary conditions and inducements to persuade a businessman to bring his
capital, know-how, and jobs to the poor. Then, if an incentive, or a group of them,
actually produced desired action at a sensible cost, legislation should be proposed.
Evidence of the workability of the incentive should be convincing to Congress.
The first step toward clearing up present misunderstandings is to start over again
and ask the right questions. The traditional governmental approach to economic
development tax incentives by-passes the right questions about taxpayer motivation
and substitutes assumptions instead. The doctrinaire government tax specialist,
a "hard line Revenuer," unencumbered by the facts as he is, adopts the silent assump-
tion that any tax incentive automatically provides a taxpayer with a sufficiently in-
creased chance for profit to justify his acceptance of any and all other risks, what-
ever they may be. With that proposition firmly established (resting, as it does, on
"all taxpayers are crybabies" theory), our man in Washington further assumes
the maximum use of the incentive by the broadest class of potentially eligible
taxpayers (which in our case means every sizeable business in the country plus a
few nasty promoters. Reliance on these unstated perceptions causes planners to miss
completely the issue of taxpayer motivation. Moreover, these perceptions result
in an overstatement of the cost of poverty area tax incentives to the government.
It is especially unfortunate that reliance on an unspoken faulty assumption not only
smothers the problem, but also loads the answer to the wrong question.
'Nothing has been proposed since August, 1968.
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These assumptions do not surface in the intense discussions, in and out of
government, relating to tax incentives. But the term "cost effectiveness" always
does. The phrase "cost effectiveness" is designed to raise the issue of whether the
government will receive what it regards as effective action in exchange for the loss
of tax revenues resulting from enactment of a particular incentive. Calculation of
the loss of tax revenues must be based on some judgment of how much less money
taxpayers will be paying because of their use of a tax incentive. Sometimes this
issue is analyzed. Often it is not. Often it does not have to be. In business operations
in which the Treasury or the Internal Revenue Service has years of experience, a
sensible estimate of the dollar amount of noncollected taxes resulting from the
use of an incentive by taxpayers can be made. However, in the unexplored area of
private sector ghetto operations, no one, in or out of government, can provide real
evidence of which tax incentives will be accepted and used. Indeed, no one knows
for sure what the extra risks will be, and a fortiori, no one can determine the costs
to be cut (by whatever legislative mechanic) in order to provide the possibility of a
profit. Because these answers are unavailable, the right question, at this stage, is not
and cannot be "cost effectiveness." The right questions are whether and to what
extent tax incentives will be used by taxpayers.
In order to forecast the dollar cost of those tax incentives which will encourage a
taxpayer to act, one must understand why a taxpayer is not now acting. Govern-
ment must understand the risks perceived by business if government is to exercise
effectively its power to (i) reduce risks or (2) trade tax benefits for acceptance of
unmeasurable risks. Government action, whether by legislation or experimental
simulation, is useless if it does not deal directly with the pitfalls which businessmen
actually see or think they see in the undertaking of an untried and unwanted project.
It must be accepted that the taxpayer for whom the incentives are to be designed
presently sees very little business reason for locating his plant in the ghetto or for
hiring the untrained. The raw economics of running most profitable businesses simply
does not justify ghetto operations. A plant put in a ghetto is subject to more risks
,han one located elsewhere. Employment of a large group of the hard-core un-
employed is thought to subject a business to more risks and costs than it faced
previously. And as of now, such increased risks are not matched by the possibility
of profit. Moreover, several of the substantial risks are not of a business nature
and, thus, are harder to measure. This means that the corporate and professional
experts who specialize in risk measurement and profit potential projections are not
equipped with the skills or experience required to forecast a dollar exposure or profit
return on a ghetto investment. When a corporate board of directors reviews any
business plan, it is the risks which they see. Thus, when a ghetto business plan is
reviewed, a board will want to know its risk potential. What will be obvious to the
board and what will cripple any chance of approval of a scheme is the absence of a
dollar exposure forecast based on experience. To such a board, approval of a ghetto
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business or employment plan would be tantamount to signing a blank check. No
businessman will do this. Businessmen want as much certainty as possible. They will
take risks if they can measure those risks. But they will not spend money-even if
they will get part of it back from the government-without some idea of whether
the spending will produce profits.
Although incentives can be created to meet a variety of circumstances, the
perceived risks which presently inhibit action by the private sector in the poverty
area seem to be common to most types of businesses. A businessman, in the privacy
of his own office, might analyze the risks he sees or thinks he sees this way:
"i. If I put hard-core employees in my plant, I must set up, and pay for, special
facilities to train them. I can get all the workers I need now to perform the functions
which the hard-core employees might be able to perform after training, so I see no
reason to spend the extra money to assure myself of a supply of employees I don't
presently require.
"2. By introducing such a group of employees into my plant, I risk the hostility
of other employees on all levels. I create labor union representation problems, and,
at worst, I may be confronted with protection and violence problems.
"3. If I put my plant in a ghetto, there is the risk that it will be burned down or
become a pawn in a political or social dispute. The issues which can trigger such
events are not business issues and thus I have no control over them nor do I have
any expertise in my organization to deal with them. I cannot buy insurance to cover
any such catastrophy. I don't want the publicity which would derive from such a
situation or the controversy leading up to it. And besides all of that, there is no
business reason for my plant to be in the ghetto in the first place.
"4. If, despite all the foregoing problems, I would still be willing to undertake
such tasks, I cannot get anyone in my already thinned-out middle management
level to take charge of a training program or a ghetto plant because he will feel
he is sidetracked from his main career, which is moving up in the mainstream
of this company.
"5. I can discharge my responsibilities to the poor with much more facility
and with no intereference in the operation of my business by making a charitable
contribution to some foundation which does what it can. This will enable me to say
'I gave at the office."'
Can fiscal incentives be developed to overcome these risks and difficulties which
the taxpayer sees as inherent in transferring jobs, facilities, and know-how to an
underdeveloped community? They can be, if initially we understand the substance
of tax incentives, the necessity for a system of incentives (and why one or two big
ones won't work), and the manner in which a taxpayer looks at an incentive package.
With this understanding, one will conclude that there are a lot of different ways
to get the job done.
When the technical convolutions of the tax code are stripped away, it appears
I02
TAx INCENTIVES
that there are only two types of tax "breaks" available: tax deferral or tax forgive-
ness. Tax deferral means that the taxpayer pays the same amount of tax he otherwise
would have to pay, but the payment of all or part of the tax is postponed until a
future time. The time to which payment is postponed is supposedly tied to an event
which will produce cash, thus making it easier to pay. That event is usually the sale
of something which presumably will produce cash to pay the taxes which, but for the
incentive, should have been paid earlier. The event which triggers the payment of
postponed tax can be almost anything. It can even be some date in the future at which
nothing actually happens, but by which time something might have happened.
In other situations, the event is merely the passing of a determinable period. Tax
forgiveness, on the other hand, is just that; the taxpayer is relieved of an obligation
to pay particular taxes.
Of course, it is not all that easy. Tax deferral or tax forgiveness or a combination
of the two principal tax incentives are always set in a complex structure of
technical requirements designed to limit the cases to which the incentive can apply
and thereby prevent abuses. It is with respect to these technical rules that a drafts-
man has great flexibility to tune and tinker the tax incentives to accomplish his
objectives and to minimize the risks perceived by the taxpayer.
What kinds of tax incentives can produce the desired action? The answer to this
question requires consideration of the twin issues of how large a single incentive
must be to motivate taxpayer action and whether an incentive of the requisite size is
too large to be passed by Congress. For example, there has been much talk of a tax
credit (partial tax forgiveness) which is geared to wages paid by companies to train
undereducated employees. The credit stops when employees reach the level at
which they can function on the production line, whenever that is. The cost of the
extra training is said to be about $3,ooo per hard-core unemployed worker. Further,
the turnover rate is said to be 5oo higher than normal for hard-core factory
labor. As discussed in detail later, extra costs over the first three years of extra
training and recruitment for a 12o man work force, half of whom are hard-core
unemployed, is $396,ooo. A io% tax credit yields an actual annual cash savings
of $39,6oo. This is hardly enough to motivate management to set up a program
which trains workers they think they can do without and which exposes the
company to extra risks which it feels it cannot handle. A tax credit of sig-
nificantly more than io%, by itself, would hardly have a chance of becoming law.
And a tax credit of iOc% (even one which does not distinguish between training and
productive time and which thus eliminates the inevitable Internal Revenue Service
bargaining audit) would not be used by a taxpayer because-it is not big enough.
Thus, dead ends will always exist at both the enactment level and the taxpayer-use
level if single tax incentives, even good ones, are considered by themselves. These
impediments are avoided by a tax incentives package which has a chance of both
being enacted and being used.
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Development of a tax incentive system for actual use will mean that a taxpayer
also has some work to do. He must guess as to the likelihood of the occurrence of
events which trigger tax savings, identify and quantify extra risks, add up his extra
costs resulting from extra risks, compare the profit producable by those costs to the
extra tax savings, isolate the nonbusiness open-ended exposures, and see if it all
makes sense. The fact that he will have to make all these judgments and assume
the risk of the occurrence of tax-significant events will not stop him. Indeed, this
is the basis of all tax planning. For example, if a taxpayer buys a building and takes
accelerated depreciation, he knows now that at a particular point in the future,
the depreciation deduction will run out and his cash flow costs will increase
because, at that future time, he will have used up his depreciation allowance.
He knows that he will have to sell the building nine or ten years from now
or start investing cash to make up for the tax benefits which have run out. Or, he
will have to buy another building and take fast depreciation on it to make up for
the loss of depreciation on the first building he bought. At the time he undertakes
the plan, he knows that he is on the depreciation treadmill and that the whole
structure will fall apart if he does not buy a second building or sell the first
one in time. Thus, an analysis involving prediction of facts and events in order to
analyze a tax package is nothing new. This is precisely how sophisticated taxpayers
think. This is the way tax incentives should be created because this is the way tax
incentives will be used, if used at all.
II
How A TAXPAYER QUANTIFiES RISKS AND DETERMIINES THE VALUE OF TAX
INcENTIvEs DESIGNED TO SHARE TIIOSE RIsKs
In 1968, the Community Self-Determination Act was jointly introduced in the
House and Senate.5 Buried in that legislation was a set of tax incentives, part of
which applied to community corporations and part of which applied to outside
companies. The outside company was the established business which had jobs to
give, had a plant to locate in the ghetto, had the know-how to do both, and of equal
importance, had the experts who could try to advise it of the consequences. The policy
decision behind the Act was that the outside company should set up the plant,
provide the training and the jobs, and then sell the plant to a community corporation
which was to be a "neighborhood conglomerate" designed eventually to own busi-
nesses. The Act set up this institutional acquiring entity owned by the "people," pro-
vided funds to make such acquisitions possible, and gave the outside company a
package of tax incentives which would offset all the risks if the plant were successful
and if the plant were actually sold. The key tax breaks, those which would provide
most of the cash to make the outside company whole and give it a profit on its risky
investment, were tied to the sale of the plant.
'S. 3875, goth Cong., 2d Sess. (i968).
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Naturally, a complex statutory "infrastructure" was thought to be required to
make this program work: (i) each poor man was to own a piece of all the com-
panies eventually purchased-hence the "community corporation"; (2) the poor
were to be provided enough money to buy the plants-hence "community economic
development banks" and nationwide government guaranteed bond issues; and (3)
with all this money and power, measures were to be taken to prevent abuses-hence
ninety per cent of the Act. Enactment of the whole institutional framework seems
unlikely, at least for now. However, some of the tax incentives designed to benefit
the outside company will be considered here because the program illustrates how a
taxpayer assesses the value of an untried tax package in an unexplored area of
business activity.
In order to quantify the risks perceived by the taxpayer and, at the same time,
examine tax mechanics designed to share some of those risks, this section of the
artcile will examine the actual dollar impact of the incentives on the taxpayer for
the purpose of determining how he will fare if he enters the poverty business.
Also considered is the issue of whether a tax incentive program in which the tax
break is tied to the sale of a successful business will work without an elaborate
"infrastructure." In part III of this article, the focus is whether there are events other
than the sale of a business to which tax benefits can be tied in order to attract tax-
payers who are not willing to sell their plants.
Assessment of the dollar impact of a tax incentive package which contemplates
eventual sale of a facility to a poor community necessitates a discussion of several
interrelated tax benefits, which, although individually insufficient, produce a sub-
stantial return in the aggregate. The tax program of the Community Self-Deter-
mination Act, stripped of much of its infrastructure, sets up these incentives:
i. Physical plant facilities will be permitted rapid tax amortization depending
upon the degree to which the community is underdeveloped. If some development
index indicates that the community is at the maximum level of economic under-
development, physical facilties including real estate may be amortized in as short a
time as thirty-six months.
2. The old investment tax credit relating to certain machinery and equipment
will be resurrected. There will, however, be no tax credit recapture upon the sale
of a facility to a "community group."
3. An additional tax credit, called the human investment tax credit, will be,
available in an amount equal to ten per cent of the wages and salaries paid by the
taxpayer to employees. No distinction is to be drawn between training and produc-
tion activities of such employees for purposes of utilizing this credit.
4. The profits received by the taxpayer upon the sale of a factility to the "com-
munity" are normally subject to a capital gain tax. Such capital gains tax, would
not then be payable so long as and to the extent the proceeds of the sale are re-
invested in another similar, operation or in low interest-bearing deppsits in a bank
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which provides extremely liberal financing to poor communities, including financing
to the "community" to buy the facility.
5. Upon the occurrence of a sale of a facility, there will be no recapture of rapid
amortization benefits, investment tax credits, or human investment tax credits so
long as and to the extent the profits of the sale are reinvested in another similar
project or in special bank deposits.
6. Following the sale of the facility to the "community," the taxpayer-seller will
receive a sustained profitability tax credit which is equal to fifteen per cent of the
profits generated from the operation of the facility for each of five years after sale.
Prior to any sale, a plant engaged in ghetto operations will be owned by a tax-
payer who, it is assumed, will have other income. A taxpayer having other income
will thus be able to utilize the tax benefits accruing prior to the sale without regard
to the profitability of the facility. The rapid amortization deduction, the resurrected
investment tax credit, and the new human investment tax credit-all of which operate
prior to a sale of the facility-can be applied by the taxpayer against its taxable
income from other sources. Carry-forward and carry-back provisions enable complete
utilization of these tax benefits by the taxpayer. The question in the taxpayer's mind
is what all these benefits are worth in hard dollars.
A specific example will illustrate the operation of these provisions.
In calculating dollar savings to the taxpayer, a conservative view has been taken.
As indicated, tax savings take two forms. First, there is tax forgiveness through the
tax credit mechanism. In this case, dollar savings are calculated as the gross amount
of tax forgiven. Second, there is deferral of the collection of taxes which is achieved
either by permitting accelerated deductibility or by actually delaying collection of a
tax. The savings from tax deferral is calculated at seven per cent of the amount
deferred. This represents either the interest charge the taxpayer would incur if he had
to borrow the money to pay the deferred taxes or, if he has the money available, the
interest he would earn if invested for the period of deferment.
A particular type of die casting plant can be started for approximately $6ooooo.
If and when profitable, it will produce pre-tax earnings of $300,000 on gross sales of
approximately $4,oooooo. Direct labor costs will run about $300,00o per year in the
casting operation, foremen's salaries will run approximately $i35,ooo, and indirect
labor costs will be about $155,ooo. Depreciable assets comprising the physical facility
will have a cost basis of approximately $20o,000, representing approximately $1ooooo
in equipment and $iooooo in real estate.
Several assumptions are necessary: the plant becomes a "community" facility;
the outside company which owns and operates the plant has other income and files
a consolidated return and, thus, can utilize all special tax benefits available to it;
and the community in which the facility is to be located is in the lowest level of
economic development, thus entitling the taxpayer to the maximum tax benefits
to be provided. What do the tax provisions yield in saved dollars to the taxpayer?
Rapid amortization within 36 months of real estate and equipment (total $200,000)
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will produce annual deductions to the taxpayer of $66,666 for each of three years.
The resurrected investment tax credit of 7% applicable to section 38 property6 will
apply to the equipment in the plant ($iooooo), yielding a direct credit against
taxes payable by the taxpayer in the amount of $7,000. The human investment tax
credit will apply to the wages of those persons in the facility. Assuming that only
one-half of the combined direct and indirect non-administrative wages are paid to
qualified employees, a first level calculation will produce a human investment tax
credit of $29,5o0 (ioo of one-half of the sum of $300,000 and $I35,ooo and $i55,oo0).
If it is assumed that an annual limitation of $25,ooo is applicable to such tax credit,
the maximum human investment tax credit for one taxable year of operations will
be $25,000 plus 56o of the excess, or a total of $27,250. The $2,250 unused excess
credit for each year is not lost; it can be carried back three years or forward seven
years.
Assuming consistent levels of employment and equipment utilization, the above
tax deduction and credit calculations apply to each of the first three years of full
operation of the facility. The savings to the taxpayer who has other income sufficient
to permit full utilization of is as follows:
(i) The annual rapid amortization deduction is $66,666. The provision speeds up
the deductibility of a fixed amount, but does not increase the amount deductible.
The benefit is basically one of cash flow in early years. The greater the amount
deductible, the less cash will be needed to pay taxes. And at the very least, fewer
dollars will -be needed to cover the cost of borrowing money to pay taxes, or, if cash
is available, more dollars will be earned upon investment. It should be recognized
that the amount of "normal" depreciation deductions vary according to the type
of asset depreciated. Likewise, land value, as such, is not depreciable. However, in
order to facilitate illustration, it will be assumed that there is a combined plant
and equipment life of ten years and that the amount of the yearly deduction does
not vary. Under these assumptions, the normal available deduction for each of ten
years would be $20,000. On the other hand, the casting plant established under the
Act may be depreciated over three years, thereby producing an extra deduction of
$46,666 per year for each of the first three years. Assuming total elimination
of the surtax and one surtax exemption utilized to cover other income, the tax rate is
48%. The tax due on $46,666 is $22,400. It is collection of this tax which is deferred
to the future. When calculated at 7%, the minimum dollar value of not having to
pay this amount is $1570 per year for each of three years.
(2) The investment tax credit is $7,00o. This is available in only one year, but is
not subject to eventual recapture. The human investment tax credit, which is enjoyed
annually, is $27,250. An unused portion to the extent of $2,250 may be carried for-
ward.
Thus, the savings during the first year is $35,820. The second and third years
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yield a net dollar saving of $28,820, or a total, over three years, of $93,46o. It
should be emphasized that the minimum savings of $93,460 over three years is
enjoyed by the taxpayer irrespective of whether the facility is profitable. The $6ooooo
investment required for the project can be highly leveraged by long term borrowings.
The annual benefits, except for rapid amortization, continue to accrue to the taxpayer
prior to sale.
Now assume that the facility is sold in the fourth year of operations and that
the encouraged transplantation of know-how has been effective so that the facility
earns a profit in the fourth year of half of its full profit potential-$i5oooO before
taxes. The tax rate for year four is 48% less one surtax exemption. The computa-
tion includes the tax payable upon income not matched by a depreciation deduction
because all depreciation deductions were utilized in the first three years. At this
point, a tax of $75,1oo is owing. The amount of net after-tax cash retained by
the taxpayer is $74,900, representing after-tax profit and depreciation adjustments.
The facility may be sold to any community group within the statutory definition
on any basis which the parties are able to negotiate. Assume a classical earnings-
multiple sale price formula is applied and that the multiple for this facility is 1o.
A critical issue is whether the specially reduced post-tax earnings of the facility
which applies once the plant is in the hands of the community should be used in
calculating the sale price. Normally, the multiplicand is post-tax earnings. The reason
for this "normal" post-tax calculation is that the purchase price is based on payment
of taxes on earnings of a facility in the hands of the acquirer. This normal rule
may be applied to the casting plant with modification. When a community group
is an acquirer, its tax rate will be lower than normal because of both a surtax
exemption of up to $2ooooo and the lower tax rates which will be in effect when
the tax becomes due.
The issue is illustrated in our example. The above model facility, when and if
completely successful, will earn $3ooooo pre-tax profit per year. Assuming that the
acquiring community group is in a severely underdeveloped community, taxes pay-
able by it on such earnings can only be $3,ooo ($3ooooo less a $2ooooo surtax exemp-
tion equals $1ooooo; oo% of the first $5oooo and 6%o of the remainder yields a
$3,ooo tax).
It has been posited, however, that the model facility is sold at a time when it has
reached only half its earning potential, namely $15oooo. Applying a special surtax
exemption to earnings of the facility after its acquisition by the community group,
no taxes will be then owing. If the sales price is negotiated on the basis of earnings
at the time of sale less taxes payable on those earnings by the transferee, the earnings
multiplicand will be $i5oooo. Given an earnings multiple of io, the sale ,price will
be $i,5ooooo.
If the classical multiple earnings formula for arriving at a sales price were
applied to the ghetto facility, the acquiring community entity, because of its special
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low tax rates, would pass on some of its special tax benefits to the outside taxpayer
in the form of a much higher purchase price. The community group would pay
more money for the facility than would a private sector purchaser subject to regular
tax rates, a result which is not necessarily unintentional.
The tax payable by the seller on the transaction can be computed from the sales
price. Normally, the tax will be 30/ of the gain plus an amount which reflects tax
recaptures. Assuming that the cost of the plant is $6ooooo, utilization by the
taxpayer of maximum 90% leverage, and an equity basis of $6oooo, his gain is
$i,46o,ooo, and his tax is $438,000. It is the collection of this tax which is delayed if
the taxpayer utilizes the sales proceeds to enter into another arrangement covered
by the statute or if he invests the proceeds in low interest-bearing accounts in a bank
which offers special loans-including the loan to buy the plant-to community
groups. At the very least, the deferral of collection of such taxes can be viewed as an
interest-free loan from the government, and at 7%, represents actual dollar savings
of $30,660 per year. Even after the facility is sold, the outside taxpayer may have
the benefit of an additional tax incentive. For each of five years following sale,
the sustained profitability tax credit offsets the taxes payable by the seller to the
extent of 1./5 of the pre-tax income of the facility. A steady profit of $150,000 per
year will produce a tax credit of $22,5oo per year, or a total credit of $112,5oo over
five years.
Thus, assuming maximum leverage (9o%) is utilized by the outside taxpayer
to set up the $6oooo facility, and assuming that all facts have worked out as
indicated, the taxpayer's $6o,ooo investment has produced (i) a tax benefit of
$93,46o in excess of what would be available if the facility were sited, elsewhere than
in the community, (2) a postponement of collection of capital gain tax of $438,000
which is worth $30,66o per year, (3) a sustained profitability tax credit of $22,500 per
year for each of five years following sale, (4) a capital gain of $I,46ooo less repay-
ment of total start-up loan of $540,000 and less capital gain taxes of $438,000 eventually
payable, and (5) net profit less tax in year four of $74,900. The taxpayer maximizes
his benefit from the incentive over a nine year period: investment in the first year,
profit by and sale of the facility in the fourth year, sale proceeds invested in tax
deferral-producing investments or deposits in the fourth year with deferral of taxes
upon sale proceeds until the ninth year. The net after tax cash return on the
F6o,ooo investment can be calculated as follows:
Investment $6oooo
Return on investment in the ninth year SI,46oooo
Post-tax income in the fourth year of operations 74,900
less (i) tax on sale proceeds in year nine (438,000)
(2) recaptures -a-
(3) repayment of initial loans (540,000)
$ 556,900
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plus:
(i) minimum dollar value of deductions (rapid write off,
section 38 tax credit; and human investment tax credit in
the first three operating years)
(2) minimum dollar value of postponement of collection of tax
on sale proceeds for five years
(3) minimum dollar value of sustained profitability tax credit
(4) carry forward or carry back of unutilized human investment
tax credit
(5) minimum dollar value of absence of recaptures on rapid
write off and section 38 tax credit assuming constant
value of underlying assets (difference between ordinary








The minimum actual dollars produced by this tax incentive program are
$4o3,27o. The amount of gain realized upon the sale of the facility is also affected
by the tax results in that the sales price formula is calculated on the basis of post-tax
earnings of the purchaser. The absence of taxes upon the income of the community
group increases the sales price. The sales price of $i,5ooooo to the "community"
was calculated at ten times earnings of $150,00o after application of the special tax
treatment afforded the community group. A non-community acquirer would pay
tax in an amount equal to that payable prior to the sale. The tax on $15o,ooo, with-
out the special tax incentives, would be $72,ooo, yielding a sales price of $780,000.
The sale to the community increases the selling price by $o,ooo. Thus, considering
the minimum dollar benefits produced by this tax package, the availability of
significant debt financing, and the likely sales price increase, the total dollar return
induced by a facility in an underdeveloped community requiring a $6oooo equity
investment is $96oi7o net after all taxes and loan repayments.
In order to determine whether the special tax features will have the desired result
of prompting taxpayer action, it is necessary to determine whether this sum is
sufficient to offset the dollar cost of risks he perceives. This inquiry requires
identification of the extra risks involved in setting up a facility in a ghetto. The
primary risk is the cost of hiring and training the hard core unemployed. Estimates
of this cost range from $i,5oo to $5,ooo per employee and include the costs of recruit-
ment, training, and decreased productivity. If the turnover rate is 50%l/ higher
than the normal 4o/ rate, a 6o% annual increase in the basic re-recruitment and re-
training costs would be experienced. Our sample facility employs approximately
12o people, half of whom are, by assumption, considered to be hard-core un-
employed. Assuming an average training cost of $3,000 per worker, the cost in the
first year would be $i8oooo. In the second year, 6o%, or thirty-six, of the hard core
employees will leave, yielding a second training cost $io8,ooo. The same result
will occur in the third year. Thus, for the first three years of operation, the extra
recruitment and training costs totals $396,ooo.
In light of this cost, the extra tax benefits yield conservative dollar savings of
only $35,820 in the first year and $28,820 in the second and third years, or a total
of $93,460 for the three years. Obviously, the tax savings at this point (which accrue
to the taxpayer whether or not the facility is profitable) are insufficient to meet
the increased special costs of ghetto operations. It is also necessary, however,
to assess the impact of attainment of profitability in the facility. On the above
facts, this is achieved in the fourth year and is immediately followed by the sale
of the facility to the community. If it is assumed that the facility earns an average
of $i5o,ooo annually over the five years after acquisition by the community, the
minimum dollar value of all tax savings to the taxpayer is $4o3,-7o, an amount
which is only $7,270 in excess of the perceived extra costs.
Thus, this tax incentive program is designed to return to the taxpayer, on approx-
imately a dollar-for-dollar basis, the extra costs involved in putting the facility into
an underdeveloped community-and then only if the positive actions taken by the
taxpayer produce the desired result of the transplantation of a profit-producing capital
facility to a poor community.
All that has been done to this point is to attempt to offset the predictable extra
costs. It is also necessary to provide a profit to cover the unpredictable, open-ended,
non-business risks. The bonus lies in the purchase price for the profitable facility.
As set forth above, this will exceed the price which would have been paid by a non-
community acquirer because the community's tax load following acquisition is less.
The amount of this profit is a matter of negotiation between the community and
the taxpayer, subject to governmental review. The existence or amount of the
profit, as it is in all acquisitions, is negotiable and as such is subject to all of the
sophisticated credit techniques which can be used to "split the difference," such as
increases in the purchase price following sale dependent upon increased actual
earnings.
Thus, on a basis of minimum dollar savings produced by the above tax incentive
package, a company which transmits its know-how and facility to the poor is made
whole following a successful effort and has an opportunity to negotiate a profit
for doing so. Following this successful effort, the community has acquired sixty
well-paying jobs which it didn't have before, and those jobs belong to the people
in the community. Further, members of the community group own a business which
is actually producing $i5o,ooo in annual earnings. Added to this would be the 5 to I
multiplier effect on new jobs produced by reinvestment of earned business profits
in other ventures.
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On the other hand, if a taxpayer uses this tax package to unload out-dated
facilities or fails to establish a new facility at viable profit-producing level in the
competitive market, he will not benefit. Likewise, if a poor community group does
not initially present to the taxpayer a stable organization, it will not attract an out-
side company in the first place and the desire for continuing jobs and profitability
will not be satisfied.
III
TAXPAYER-SELECTED TAx INCENTIVES
The tax package analyzed above presents a fairly rigid scheme. It places the
taxpayer in a tight factual grid in which the government's power to trade tax money
for acceptance of open-ended risks comes into play with significant tax dollars only
when a plant is sold to a community group. In order to qualify for the tax benefits,
the taxpayer must use his money first on a roughly io to i ratio and maintain that
level of expenditure for approximately four years. Moreover, he must assume the
risk of being able to find a community group to purchase his plant, and he must
rely on their ability, not his own, to run the plant after the sale. If any one sig-
nificant event misfires, the benefits of the program evaporate and the taxpayer loses
a significant amount of money. Few taxpayers would regard this tax package as
overwhelmingly attractive. At best, a taxpayer would regard it as a nice gamble,
and only because of the big pot of tax benefit gold at the end of a nine-year rainbow.
The policy decisions reflected in the tax package have fixed the dollar flow of tax
benefits to a trickle in the early years. The tax incentive dollars produced in these
years come nowhere near what the taxpayer is then paying out. As compensation for
the mismatch of dollar benefits to dollar exposure in the early years, a huge tax break
occurs upon sale and continued profitability of a plant. A large reward for a suc-
cessful undertaking of a huge long-term risk is the basis of this tax package. But
only this risk is rewarded by this tax system. A more attractive alternative incentive
system may exist.
To find that alternative, it is not necessary to review a whole series of tax incentive
packages and decide which one is best. An attempt to find the tax incentive package
which is "best" merely compounds the error of trying to guess what incentives will
encourage a taxpayer to act. By selecting one tax package which rewards only one
rigid risk mix, a legislature would merely be speculating as to what will work in
a highly complex and largely unexplored area. Moreover, selecting a "best" program
would cancel out use of all of the imagination available in the private sector.
The task of a tax incentive program is to provide the taxpayer with a reason
for doing something or, negatively stated, to minimize the risks which heretofore
inhibited his desire to act. But, at the same time, a tax incentive program which is
to operate in the unknown area of community economic development should not be
designed or accidentally drafted in a way which dictates either the types of
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businesses to be provided or the methods of providing them. A tax incentive pro-
gram which works only for highly labor-intensive investments and which does not
encourage action by businesses with a reverse mix of labor and capital goods excludes
industries of the future. Moreover, a program which works only if a taxpayer is
willing to sell his plant to others will most likely exclude companies having pro-
prietary products-those companies will not transfer their patents or whatever to
companies which they do not control. A system which excludes from its benefits
any significant type of business or which limits too greatly the method of providing
meaningful career jobs to the poor may be less desirable than no incentive program
at all. It is, again, over-promising. A one-track tax incentive program which freezes
the kinds of economic development and narrows the methods for achieving develop-
ment is especially unwanted in cases where those who develop the structure are not
the businessmen who will have to take the risks.
A crucial question concerns the likelihood that a system of tax incentives for
ghetto operations can be developed which will provide a taxpayer with different
sets of benefits chosen by him to meet the risks he sees in a specific business op-
portunity. Moreover, it must be asked whether a system can be developed which
will appeal to both the taxpayer who is willing to take only small risks, even at
the expense of affecting the size of eventual benefits, as well as the taxpayer who is
willing to assume a large risk if it would potentially yield a significant return.
Of course, it is possible to permit such flexibility, and there are probably several
mechanical ways to do it.
One workable multi-track community development tax incentives program would
utilize all of the substantive tax incentives outlined earlier, but instead of fixing
the amount of the benefit, the program would adopt several modifications. (i) The
amount of the incentive would be variable within an established range. (2) The
taxpayer would be permitted to choose the amount he wished to assign to a
particular incentive. (3) The taxpayer could choose to attach a larger benefit to one
tax incentive with the effect that this would limit the size of the benefit he could
obtain under another incentive. (4) The total amount of benefits chosen by the
taxpayer would be controlled by use of a limitation expressed in terms of either
dollars or points assigned to particular benefits.
A simple example will illustrate the effect of this type of multi-track tax incentive
program. The program which included the following benefits might utilize the
following value allocation: 7
I. Rapid write off of physical facilities.
(a) Write off covering the physical plant but not real estate.
(i) in 36 months-X points
The use of the symbol X instead of a number is intentional. By doing so, a discussion of the
value of any particular incentives is postponed until a detailed system is worked up and tried out. What
is important now is the principle of and experimentation with a taxpayer's choice incentive system.
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(ii) in 30 months-X plus 2 points
(iii) in 24 months-X plus 4 points
(b) Write off of both physical facility and real estate
(i) in 36 months-X points
(ii) in 30 months-X plus 2 points
(iii) in 24 months-X plus 4 points
2. Physical facility investment tax credit.
at 7 %-X points
at 8%--X plus 2 points
at 9 %/o--X plus 4 points
at ioo--X plus 6 points
3. Human investment tax credit.
at IoP-X points
at II -X plus 2 points
at i2/--X plus 4 points
at i3%--X plus 6 points
4. Postponement of capital gain on sale; non-re-capture in event of sale; sustained
flexibility tax credit effective after sale.
(a) If elected-X plus 20 points
(b) If not elected, then double the amount of benefits otherwise elected may
be chosen
A multi-track incentive system, such as that suggested above, would permit
the taxpayer to select a package of tax incentives tailored to: (a) the precise type of
business which the taxpayer is considering for ghetto operation, (b) the peculiar risks
he perceives in the project, and (c) a flow of tax benefits in which the amount and
timing of the tax advantage is inversely proportionate to the risks accepted by the
taxpayer. For example, a taxpayer considering labor intensive operation which
requires a relatively small investment in physical facilities would choose the highest
human investment tax credit available. He would not be particularly concerned
about tax benefits relating to physical facilities whether such tax benefits took the form
of rapid right-offs or physical facility investment credits. By selecting the highest
possible percentage of human investment tax credit, he would not only be selecting
a benefit with particular application to his business, but he would have also decided
that he wanted the cash flow resulting from the selected tax benefit to match as
closely as possible the time at which he is required to spend money on the hard
core unemployed. The human investment tax credit is an example of partial tax
forgiveness which occurs in the year of the qualifying expenditure, rather than
at some later time at which the risk of the occurrence of some event must be accepted
by the taxpayer. Because the human investment tax credit is available in the year
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of expenditure and is available to the taxpayer upon the occurrence of an event
controlled by him, namely paying his hard core employees, he not only has selected
a tax benefit which applies to his kind of business and received the benefit in the
year he paid his money; but he has also made receipt of the benefit a certainty, or
at the very least, highly predictable. In exchange for receiving tax benefits con-
currently with the expenditures which produce them, the taxpayer gives up a larger
tax benefit contingent upon future events which would have subjected him to more
risk. If the tax package of the Community Self-Determination Act is based upon
a policy of providing a taxpayer with a large reward for undertaking a large risk,
the tax incentives selected by the taxpayer in this example show the operation of
a tax system which exchanges a smaller tax benefit for a smaller risk.
Under a flexible system, there are legion combinations of tax benefit packages which
can be designed by a taxpayer for his specific operation to compensate for the num-
ber, type, and degree of risks he is willing to accept. The permutations available
under a multi-track tax incentive program are exactly what is required to encourage
the experimentation necessary to provide evidence of the type of incentives which
actually encourages private sector investment in the ghetto. It is only at this point-
the point in time when the evidence is in-that will be possible to determine
which combination of incentives, if any, were successful and, then, whether the
government got its money's worth.
IV
SHoULD TAx INcENTImv BE UsED AT ALL?
Many thoughtful men in government, in law schools, and elsewhere have spent
much time and effort considering the viability of tax incentives as a means of
encouraging taxpayer action. Opinion differs widely. Some take the position that
utilization of tax incentives is a misuse of the taxing power, a distortion of the
symmetry of the Code, and an evil which provides the opportunity to achieve
artificial transactions in order to benefit the rich who are fortunate enough to be
able to hire tax advisers. Others suggest that a new start be made with the tax code
and that we reduce the tax rate significantly and eliminate all of the gimmicks.
Although over one thousand pages of tax code may not be a desirable thing, it does
exist, and it is the author's view that this should be dealt with as it is, not as it
might have been.
Unbridled faith in the utilization of tax benefits is a position taken by others.
It is true, for example, that the use of a xo% tax credit achieves the result of having
a taxpayer spend $9 for every dollar the government is willing to spend to achieve
certain action. Obviously, this represents a first level $9 savings to the government
if it were in the position to spend the $io in the first place. There are very few who
would suggest the multiplier effect resulting from the use of incentives is not an
important factor to consider.
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It does seem, however, that there may be certain risks for the private sector in
community economic development which cannot be solved by tax incentives, no
matter how big they are, no matter how much taxpayer choice there is, and no
matter how lenient the Internal Revenue Service is willing to be on audit. It has been
pointed out that incentive legislation enables the government to exercise its power
to either reduce risks or trade incentives for acceptance of unmeasurable risks which
currentiy inhibit desired action by the private sector. To the extent that a risk is a
business risk-that is, one which is calculable in dollars and of a type familiar to the
taxpayer-tax or other fiscal incentives are probably applicable. On the other hand,
if a risk is a non-business nature-unmeasurable by application of currently avail-
able business skills-one ought to have second thoughts about using tax benefits
to overcome it.
For example, a non-business risk which appears to be in the minds of many
businessmen is the fear that their plant, whether in the ghetto or elsewhere employ-
ing the hard core unemployed, will become the subject of a political or social
dispute. This is the kind of risk which businessmen do not know how to measure.
And worse, they find it difficult to sense the occurrence of an innocent appearing set
of facts which might give rise to a situation in which their plant becomes a pawn
in a social battle. The tax incentive designed to meet this problem would, in effect,
become income interruption insurance. A total loss coverage tax incentive would
never become law. But this problem may be the proper subject of a special govern-
ment insurance program in which private sector insurance companies develop a
pooled risk program with government participation.
The risk that a plant may become involved in a political dispute is not a new
problem to American businessmen who have operated overseas in underdeveloped
nations. In such cases of overseas economic development, the risks of war and civil
disturbance are often present to varying degrees. Congress approached this problem
years ago, and legislation was created to meet the risks preceived by American busi-
nessmen 8 Under an investment guarantee program an American company could
buy "political risk insurance" from the government which covered some of the risks
of war, rebellion, and civil commotion. It was provided that the insurance would not
be available unless it was the very issuance of a guarantee which "encouraged" the
company to make the investment. Thus, the legislation creating the investment
guarantee program specifically acknowledged that it could be used only by a com-
pany which was otherwise unwilling to act because of its perception of certain risks.
It is not suggested, however, that the foreign investment guarantee program could
be applied directly to business activities in domestically underdeveloped areas. The
analogy is not sufficiently complete to permit the transposition.
The example should indicate that it is possible to develop a workable incentive
system which would offset measurable business risks. But it seems equally clear that
'Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. § 2351 (1964).
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tax incentives cannot offset certain risks of a non-business nature which cannot be
measured in dollars and the occurrence of which cannot be successfully forecasted.
A program combining a multi-track tax incentive program and a "domestic invest-
ment guarantee program" should be developed. If successful, it would likely be
cheaper, from the government's point of view, than either the undertaking of com-
munity economic development by the public sector or the symptomatic control of
the social problems of the ghetto by expanded police and riot control forces.
V
A NOBLE EXPEIuMENT
If a program involving a multi-track taxpayer's choice tax incentive system and
an investment guarantee insurance pool (or insurance company tax incentives) is
to be tried, it seems that Congress is entitled to some evidence that such program
will work before it legislates such matters into the Internal Revenue Code. The
current fad is to develop "models." It is always possible to select facts, select a group
of tax incentives, and program a computer so that it will apply such facts and
incentives to each other in order to produce pro forma or actual operating financial
statements of a "model" company and "model" tax returns to show what would
happen if a particular "model" program would have been in effect at the time.
Even this much is helpful because it is more than has been done before. However,
computers are only able to add, subtract, multiply, and divide; they are not able
to judge. An artificial attempt to computerize unquantified risks in an unexplored
area is a guess on a print-out sheet; nothing more. Indeed, such an attempt is
nothing more than what was done in part II of this article and both efforts are
subject to criticism if they are represented as anything more than guesses. A great
deal more experimentation is required than can be provided by a nude computer
or law review articles. Only by intentionally introducing the human element into
the equation is it possible to provide a sampling of actual taxpayer use of in-
centives. And it is only that kind of evidence which ought to justify the creation
of new sections in the tax code or the creation of a government insurance program
of the type which will work.
I suspect that somewhere in the federal government there are funds available
to actually simulate the effect of tax and/or insurance incentives on more than
a six month or one year basis and that there is someone in the government to decide
which agency or inter-agency pidgeon hole should receive the project. The mechanics
are not the issue, for the success of the experiment depends on other factors. The
question is not so much the availability of funds to simulate such a program, or
the style of the simulation, but, as is true in most cases, the key is the human
beings who administer such a program. We are dealing with questions of taxes.
We are dealing with business people and we are dealing with a relationship of a
taxpayer to the Internal Revenue Service and to eventual audits performed by it.
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It seems that an attempt to experiment with possible tax laws before they become
laws would have its best chance of being successful if guided by the toughest, most
suspicious, no-nonsense tax specialists and hard-line Revenuers the government
has in its shop. If nothing else, this would at least make people available who can
speak a businessman's language. But there is something else: having tax people in
the act minimizes the very human bias which propels any man to sink a project
if he, the expert, was not in on it in the first place.
This is not to say that the Office of Economic Opportunity or the Model Cities
office or parts of the Commerce Department or parts of the Labor Department or,
indeed, counselors or advisers at the White House should not get involved in such
programs. They are all, in one way or another, in the poverty business; and since
tax incentives or an insurance program are designed to add an additional tool for
the achievement of their goals, it would certainly be a mistake to exclude such
people. To formulate and to simulate tax incentives without tax people, however,
would invite disaster.
Tax experts know that if the problem were to aid the growth of a specific in-
dustry, there would be a half-century of tax incentive tradition and evidence avail-
able so that exhaustive experimentation would not be necessary. In such cases, the
analysis would be carried along within predictable and acceptable lines emanating
from a defined and proven source. But the task faced now is to aid any kind of
business, not as an end in itself, but as a means to provide a self-supported future
to poor people. This task assigned to tax incentives is new in this country, without
tradition and without factual evidence of its viability. The work done now is the
source. The issue is: the source of what? The thinking, the testing, and the
theories we struggle with are more than games for the amusement of lawyers and
professors. To experiment is to produce evidence, and a simulation may produce
a method, other than welfare, to help change the grim reality which makes life
so brutalizing for so many. Of course, the evidence may point the other way.
If the end result of the simulation is that neither tax incentives nor insurance pro-
grams will encourage private sector participation in poverty areas, so be it. At
least we will have tried something useful and we will know more then than we know
now.
